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East Palestine Derailment Deep Dive
Rail accidents have been down for the past 20 years. The East Palestine accident placed a spotlight on railroad accidents.
Foreword
In recent weeks, several train derailments occurred and made the news. This post provides insight into train accidents and updates my essay, The East Palestine Ohio Train Wreck: a Study in Hysteria. Enjoy the deep dive.
Train Crew Staffing and Accidents
Much discussion occurred after Norfolk Southen’s East Palestine, Ohio accident on February 3, 2023. Some of the concerns deal with train crew staffing.
In short, there has always been one engineer. In the old days, an engineer, fireman, and lead brakeman were in the engine operating compartment (cab). With no steam engines, there was no need for a fireman. Even so, the fireman position remained until the 1970s, and the conductor and brakeman were in the caboose.1 With improvements in communication technology, railroads eliminated the use of cabooses at the end of the 20th century.2 The conductor ended up in the cab with the engineer, and with a few exceptions, railroads eliminated the other positions. In place of the caboose, a flashing rear-end device (FRED) marked the end of the train. More recently, a telemetry device indicates to the engineer if the train’s rear is intact. This is also called a FRED (freight rear-end device) or end-of-train device. When the engineer places the brake handle in the emergency position, a radio signal goes to the modern FRED to expel air from the train line pipe, so the emergency brake action starts from both ends of the train, which is a good thing.
Some railroads want to eliminate the conductor, but that is getting stiff resistance. In the early 1900s, a fireman, engineer, and lead brakeman worked in the cab. Plus, they had a conductor, brakeman, and flagman in the caboose.3 It could be argued the operation of shorter trains with a caboose enabled the rear-end crew to see the smoke from a malfunctioning car before its total failure and take appropriate action (apply the emergency brake). On the other hand, the modern wayside equipment detector (WED) can warn train crews. Thus, the train crew size of modern railroading likely had no bearing on the East Palestine accident as that was a mechanical failure. Also, the spacing of WEDs and the temperature alert thresholds are under scrutiny because of the East Palestine accident. Also, see my write-up about Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR).
Freight railroads have been reducing the number of employees in all crafts while keeping traffic levels high. That is possible with technologies like WEDs and changes to operational practices such as very long trains. See Train Handling below.
Rail accidents have been down for the past 20 years. The East Palestine accident placed a spotlight on railroad accidents. Since then, several high-profile derailments have occurred. To form a perspective view, in 2022, there were 1,173 reportable derailments. That averages to just over three per day. Most are “minor,” meaning they typically occur at low speed in yards without hazmat spills or injuries.
Upon grabbing additional data from the Federal Railroad Administration’s safety data site at 1.12, there is an uptick in the rate of accidents (derailments and collisions) per million train miles—a concern.4
Recent derailments have kindled headlines like Montana Train Derailment Sparks Conspiracy Theories. The theory is no theory, as these things happen. Legacy media and the “others” must stop reacting and report the known facts. Let the railroads, investigators, and regulators learn and move on to prevent future incidents.
Hazmat by Rail
The transportation of hazardous materials by rail is nothing new. Statistically, 99.9% of the commodities get to the intended destination without incident. However, railroads carry much larger quantities in one railcar than a truck. Thus, just one incident like East Palestine can lead to a tumultuous situation. Of note, as coal traffic declines, oil traffic, and ethanol traffic increase. It is obvious which of these three commodities is very safe to transport—an example of a negative related to the Green New Deal.
Nasty stuff like vinyl chloride makes modern life possible. Of course, there should always be work done to improve safety. Being in the rail industry for 45 years, I can say there is no nefarious “plan.” However, I am concerned about crony capitalism and its potential impact on rail safety.
Train Handling
As for the reduction in the number of train crews, that is true. Class I operations (the large railroads) along their major trunk lines are doubling (and more!) long trains. I have concerns about these monsters, called very long trains (VLT). But not for the reasons most think about. The buff (compression) and draft (tension) forces thru the length of the VLT trains are dissipated by engines interspersed the entire train length. That technology is called distributed power unit (DPU) operation. The engineer controls all the DPU engines through state-of-the-art radio and electronics. That does an excellent job of dissipating the buff and draft forces.
While the DPUs handle train forces, there are a host of additional problems associated with this method of operation. Briefly, VLTs occupy crossings too long (e.g., blocking first responders), make it near impossible for the conductor to walk next to the train in an emergency (some trains are over two miles long), and VLTs gum up the fluidity of train lines. And that is just for starters.
ECP Brakes
Because of the East Palestine accident, the lack of electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes on freight trains has taken on mystical powers. However, it is easy to explain the mystery of this device. First, this technology is not a new thing. It is widely used in passenger trains. It is an add-on to the existing pneumatic air brake systems. To claim that today’s air brake system is the same technology as Civil War trains is akin to claiming today’s automobile wheels are the same as Roman chariot wheels.5
In justifying its original ECP proposed ruling in 2014, the Department of Transportation (USDOT) speculated that ECP brakes would reduce the severity of accidents by reducing the dynamic energy. Researchers found that, on representative 100-car trains, ECP brakes would result, on average, in 1.2 to 1.6 fewer railcars derailing in an accident. In the case of tank cars, the probability of a significant (more than 100 gallons) release of hazmat from these 1.2 to 1.6 railcars is less than 5% for tank cars meeting the latest USDOT specifications. Of course, it is double the figure for a 200-car train. Nevertheless, ECPs would not have prevented the mechanical caused accident in East Palestine but may have slightly mitigated the pileup.
In non-DPU trains, when the engineer reduces the “trainline” pipe pressure, the train brakes apply from the lead engine of a train. Called “automatic brake application,” the change in pressure then travels the length of the trainline to set up the valve on each car to direct the reservoir air pressure to the brake cylinders. Railroads use DPUs throughout a train, allowing the brake signal to reach all train cars more quickly. Thus, DPUs can provide much of the effectiveness of ECP systems. The Norfolk Southern train at East Palestine had two head-end engines, 149 railcars, and one DPU between railcar positions 109 and 110.
BLEVE
Tank cars on their sides from a wreck may have the pressure relief device (PRD) internally covered by liquid. Otherwise, they function on the vapor in an upright position. In a derailment fire scenario, the vapor space changes, and when that vapor reaches the start to discharge pressure, it starts pushing on the liquid. The problem can be that the rapid buildup of gases will not be discharged and hopefully push on the liquid they open the valve.
In aggravated circumstances, cars might go into a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) because the liquid boils. The vapor expands exponentially at the weakest point, causing the car to fail with sometimes airborne dynamics. As an important point, NTSB testing found anomalies with the function of some PRDs requiring further testing and evaluation.
It is important to remember the above circumstances when discussing the intentional burning of vinyl chloride in the five tank cars at the accident site. That action by the hazmat professionals triggered massive discussion and speculation. Understandably so. However, it is necessary to remember that first responders are always at risk, even in auto accidents, house fires, etc. Concerning “cooling” the derailed cars with water or transferring the commodity to tanker trucks, it is easy to criticize the decisions on the ground. We do not know all the details about the cars’ orientation, content reaction, etc. As bad as things are, we must give some credence to the professionals who had to make critical decisions.6
There is heightened concern about the quantity of dioxin resulting from the burning of vinyl chloride compared to the same reaction from the combustion of all other materials. For more detail, I recommend that readers consult sources with expertise in the chemistry field.
Speeding Trains
To address the concern about “speeding trains,” the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) addresses that aspect of railroading. The FRA’s Track Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 213) classify track segments based on authorized speeds for freight and passenger trains. Tolerances are specified in Part 213 for each class of track. A deviation beyond the limiting tolerances for Classes 1 through 5 requires repair or reduced speeds to the appropriate class.
The designation “Excepted” in the above table permit the operation of freight trains over certain low-density tracks and associated yard tracks and sidings with minimal requirements. It allows railroads to not comply with certain portions of Part 213 unless otherwise expressly stated. However, by designating a track as excepted, the owner must restrict all train movements to a maximum of 10 m.p.h., restrict the number of placarded hazardous material cars in a train to five, and prohibit the movement of occupied passenger trains.
The initial speed of any track is based on the design characteristics of the track. FRA does not set the speed, and railroads are required to keep track in compliance with the requirements of Part 213. In addition to track design characteristics, speeds may be set by other factors, such as the type of signal apparatus. Maximum speeds are also limited if a signal system is not in place on a track (please see 49 CFR Sec. 236.0 for further information). For speeds above 80/90 (Classes 6 through 9), see 49 CFR Part 213 Subpart G.
In the case of East Palestine, Norfolk Southern Train No. 32N was traveling about 47 mph at the time of the derailment, which was less than the maximum authorized timetable speed of 50 mph. Thus Norfolk Southern is bound to maintain the track in East Palestine to FRA Class 4 requirements. The imposition of additional speed restrictions in locations such as towns is a matter of mutual agreement between railroads and municipalities for such limitations.
Relatedly, train movements near the derailment site are authorized by cab signals and wayside signal indications with an overlaid “positive train control” system. The positive train control system was enabled and operating during the derailment.7
The Cause
All the above notwithstanding, the likely cause was the failure of a roller-bearing journal. That exact type of failure, occurring less than a dozen times a year nationwide, while uncommon, is nothing new. Upon the release of NTSB’s forensic reconstruction, we will know the root cause. At first blush, East Palestine is an accident with investigators focusing on mechanical. Also, the alert threshold of the wayside detectors is under scrutiny.
Please remember that some of my essay suppositions will change with more revelations, but that always happens.
Afterword
Like most high-profile accidents, there will be changes. Already, rail safety bills have floated in Congress to address the East Palestine accident. Time will tell what will finally make it to the final rulemaking process for enforcement by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
Thoughts and prayers go to East Palestine that Norfolk Southern and the government do the best for the residents. 📕
Added Bonus!
For a nostalgic look at the golden age of trains, here is my favorite all-time railroad documentary, Railroaders:
With the end of the steam engine in regular service, the fireman’s position remained as a “student engineer” for a decade or so. Today, a student engineer is in the cab on an ad hock basis. Tourist railroads with steam engines continue to use firemen (e.g., see Smokey But Mostly Peaceful Crash).
Using cabooses in trains provided several advantages, particularly in the era of steam engines. Some of the benefits of using a caboose include the following:
Crew accommodation: Cabooses were used as a rolling office and living space for train crews, typically consisting of a conductor and a brakeman. Cabooses provided a place for crews to rest, eat, and perform administrative duties while on long journeys, especially on freight trains that traveled across remote areas with limited facilities. Cabooses were equipped with sleeping quarters, a stove for cooking, and a desk for paperwork, providing a comfortable space for crew members during their shifts.
Equipment storage: Cabooses provided storage space for tools, spare parts, and other equipment that could be used for routine maintenance or repairs to the train or track. This allowed crew members to carry essential supplies and tools, reducing the need to rely on external resources and enabling them to address minor issues while moving.
Observation platform: Cabooses were equipped with an elevated observation platform, a cupola, from which crew members could have a clear view of the train, including the couplings between the cars. This allowed for visual monitoring of the train’s operation, such as checking for signs of problems with the cars, wheels, or couplings and detecting issues like hot bearings or dragging equipment. The cupola also helped crews to identify and address potential safety hazards along the track, such as obstructions or track defects.
Safety: Cabooses were designed with safety features, such as handrails, ladders, and grab irons, to provide a safe working environment for crew members while on board. The enclosed cupola also allowed crew members to view the surroundings better, which could help identify and address safety hazards or other potential risks along the track.
Setting switches: With cabooses, when a train departed a yard or industry track to occupy a man track at a hand throw (manual) switch, the engineer would stop the train once it was entirely on the main track. Then, a rear-end crew member would set the switch and lock it to the “normal” (main track) position. Today, railroads have procedures such as using “utility” employees to set switches or special operating procedures. For example, communication protocols ensure the engineer knows of a misaligned switch in advance to stop and line it for the proper route.
Train control and communication: Cabooses were equipped with various communication and signaling devices, such as radios, flags, lanterns, and hand signals, which allowed crew members to communicate with the locomotive engineer and other members of the train crew. Cabooses also had a braking system that allowed the crews to apply or release the train’s brakes, providing an additional means of controlling the train’s speed and movements, especially during emergencies or when the train needed to be stopped quickly.
With advancements in technology, changes in operational practices, and the transition to more modern locomotives, cabooses have fallen out of use. However, they played an essential role in the history of rail transportation, providing a safe and functional workspace for train crews during the era of steam locomotives.
In 1930, a typical freight train crew would consist of several key roles, each with specific responsibilities:
Engineer: The engineer operated the powerful engine that pulled the train. The engineer controlled the locomotive’s speed, brakes, and other mechanical functions. They were also in charge of navigating the train along the designated route, following signals and instructions from the dispatcher.
Fireman: The fireman worked alongside the engineer and was responsible for tending to the locomotive’s boiler. This included shoveling coal into the firebox to maintain the necessary steam pressure, regulating the fire, and adjusting the boiler controls. The fireman also assisted the engineer with various tasks, such as monitoring gauges and checking for any locomotive issues.
Conductor: The conductor was in charge of the entire train and its crew. They were responsible for ensuring that the train operated safely and efficiently. This included overseeing the loading and unloading of freight, coordinating with the engineer on the train’s movement, and communicating with the dispatcher and other railroad personnel. The conductor also managed the train’s paperwork, including waybills and other documents.
Brakemen: The brakemen were responsible for operating the train’s brakes. This included applying and releasing brakes on the individual cars as needed during the train’s operation. Brakemen also assisted with coupling and uncoupling cars, setting hand brakes, and ensuring the train complied with safety regulations. They also acted as lookouts for any obstacles or dangers along the track.
Flagman: The flagman was responsible for protecting the rear of the train. They would carry a flag or lantern to signal to other trains that their train was not in motion and to warn of any obstructions on the track. The flagman would also assist with setting up markers (special red lights indicating the rear of the train), flags, and other warning devices to ensure the safe operation of the train.
Head-end brakeman: The head-end brakeman was responsible for assisting the conductor and the engineer with various tasks at the front of the train. This could include assisting with switching operations, handling couplings and uncouplings, and providing support during emergencies or other situations.
Overall, the freight train crew in 1930 worked as a team to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the train, following established rules and procedures of the railroad company they worked for. Their roles required physical strength, technical skills, and a deep understanding of railroad operations and safety regulations. It was a demanding and challenging job that required close coordination and communication among the crew members to ensure successful freight transportation.
Another metric to normalize the data is the annual million gross tons of traffic. However, figures are not yet available for 2021 and 2022.
The history of railroad air brakes in the United States dates back to the mid-19th century. Before the development of air brakes, trains were stopped by manually applying brakes to each car using a hand-operated wheel. This system was slow and inefficient, often leading to accidents, particularly on long trains or steep grades.
In 1868, an American inventor and industrialist, George Westinghouse, patented the first practical air brake system for train use. The system used compressed air to distribute the braking force throughout the train, allowing the engineer to control the speed and stopping distance of the entire train from a single point.
Westinghouse’s air brake system quickly gained popularity among railroads in the United States and worldwide, providing a safer and more efficient way to stop trains. However, it wasn’t until the 1880s that the use of air brakes was mandated by law on all trains in the United States.
Implementing air brakes helped significantly reduce the number of accidents and fatalities on railroads, making train travel much safer for passengers and crew. Today, air brakes are a standard feature on all locomotives and trains in the United States, and they continue to play a critical role in the safe operation of the railroad industry.
The following is from NTSB’s preliminary report explaining the reaction of the vinyl chloride cars:
On February 5, responders mitigated the fire, but five derailed DOT-105 [see Tank Car Resource Center below] specification tank cars (railcars 28–31 and 55) carrying 115,580 gallons of vinyl chloride continued to concern authorities because the temperature inside one tank car was still rising. This increase in temperature suggested that the vinyl chloride was undergoing a polymerization reaction, which could pose an explosion hazard. Responders scheduled a controlled venting of the five vinyl chloride tank cars to release and burn the vinyl chloride, expanded the evacuation zone to a 1-mile by 2-mile area, and dug ditches to contain released vinyl chloride liquid while it vaporized and burned. The controlled venting began about 4:40 p.m. on February 6 and continued for several hours.
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has approved several designs for railroad tank cars, each specifically designed to transport a particular type of hazardous material safely. I recommend the Railway Supply Institute’s Tank Car Resource Center for more information about railroad tank car design, trends, etc.
Positive Train Control (PTC) is an advanced technology designed to prevent train collisions, derailments caused by excessive speed, and unauthorized train movements. It is an automated system that constantly monitors the location, speed, and direction of trains and can automatically take control of the train to avoid accidents.
PTC uses a combination of wireless communication, GPS technology (or wayside transponders), and onboard computer systems to transmit real-time data between trains and control centers. The system monitors the train’s location, speed, and direction and can automatically apply the brakes if necessary to prevent accidents.
The development and implementation of PTC is a critical safety measure for the rail industry and is mandated by the Federal Railroad Administration for certain types of trains operating on certain tracks.
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The Frederick R. Smith blog is the ramblings of an uncommon man in a post-modern world. As a master of few topics, your author desires to give readers a sense of the thoughts of a senior citizen who lived most of his life before the new normal.
I've got to say, I really appreciate your telling of how trains are operated and the controls. I find it fascinating. I think it was my Great Grandfather, worked for the railroad, I don't know which company, in the late 1800s. Maybe that's why I like trains.
Frederick, thanks for an authoritative explanation of the way railroading works and what happened in East Palestine. A great change of pace.
Happy Easter to you and your family